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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Operational and Strategic Genius: Building the Main Battery for
the New Maritime Strategy
The “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” suggests new
ways to design and operate the Navy. How do we anticipate what our
leaders must learn to implement the Navy’s new strategy and its en-
abling concepts?
ONE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE’S key missions is to prepare fu-
ture leaders to operate effectively at the operational and strategic levels. This is
the realm of the senior operational headquarters, a realm characterized by a
wide scope of responsibility, geopolitical consequence, complexity, and uncer-
tainty—a realm where the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational el-
ements of national power intersect and must be managed. This is a realm where
no one gives the leader a playbook or clear terms of relations with other stake-
holders; nor is there likely to be an agreed-to organization chart. A commander
at this level, charged with huge responsibilities, may find that he or she has not
even been given a useful or practicable mission statement. Moreover, the com-
mander and staff may discover that they are effectively “in charge” of very little,
yet expected to deliver much.
How do we know that our curricula in fact prepare our students to meet this
challenge? How do we figure out just what competencies leaders and those in
supporting roles within our various operational headquarters will need to be
successful in such a dynamic—indeed, chaotic—realm? Add to this the fact that
the concept of a maritime headquarters is in full-blown transformation, and
you get some idea of just how difficult a task this is. The Naval War College has
worked with great focus and served as a “thought leader” and implementer of a
range of initiatives to instantiate the Navy’s goal to be “a service focused at the
operational level of war”* and support the broader policy objectives defined in
* This is the primary proposition that emerged in January 2006 from the first “CNO’s Maritime Se-
curity Conference,” which brought together the senior operational leadership of the Navy to con-
sider its most pressing operational issues.
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that strategy. Being at the nexus of this activity, the College is in an ideal position
to help the Navy define both the functions and the competencies necessary to
meet its goals.
Globalization has changed many features of war, and we see many of its rules
changing as well. As our new maritime strategy (www.navy.mil/maritime/
MaritimeStrategy.pdf) points out, maritime forces must play an increasingly
prominent and strategic role, and they require close collaboration with interna-
tional forces and nonmilitary organizations to do so. Coordinating and syn-
chronizing activities across such a wide range of diverse partners emerge as key
functions of a joint force commander. Coordinated and synchronized employ-
ment of joint, multinational, and multiagency forces in both peacetime and
wartime demands a very sophisticated, globally netted command-and-control
(C2) capability and a comprehensive system that develops Navy leaders able to
use it. The maritime strategy emphasizes the necessity of understanding and
employing maritime forces as a continuously engaged, globally distributed im-
plement of national influence. This places an even greater premium on building
the genius necessary to grasp the essence of a problem, to appreciate it in a stra-
tegic framework. It also assumes that the necessary competencies—cognitive
and practical—will be in place to apply that force with strategic effectiveness.
The new strategy has brought into focus the links between maritime capabil-
ity, the stability it ensures, and global prosperity. To achieve the underlying goal
of regional or global maritime security, however, demands a degree of inter-
agency and international cooperation never before achieved. The requirement is
not so much for unity of command as for unity of effort. That unity relies on po-
litical mechanisms, decision processes, information and technical standards,
and protocols to bring diverse stakeholders in global and regional stability into
more cooperative and effective relationships.
Two drivers of naval force design emerge from the doctrinal logic of the strat-
egy: the need for combat-credible forces focused in regions where the potential
for major conventional operations is highest and where the demand for a promi-
nent, war-winning deterrent is greatest; and the need for globally distributed
forces tailored to specific regional strategies. The two drivers signal an evolution
beyond the general-purpose force designed for the Cold War era.
Implications for How We Operate Naval Forces
The Naval Operating Concept supporting the strategy recognizes this evolution
in how naval forces are used. Task forces are being employed less today as inte-
grated formations built around aircraft carriers or big-deck amphibs and more
as arrays of multipurpose platforms. These platforms can be dynamically em-
ployed to create a wide range of discrete operational-level effects—beyond the
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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awareness and control horizons of the group commander and his more tactically
oriented staff. Further, naval forces are increasingly understood and valued as
constituting a key strategic element of national power, applicable not just in a re-
serve or supporting role in the case of a major conventional operation but as an
engagement force applied globally in a synchronized, concerted fashion “24/7,”
365 days a year, to achieve strategic effects—to prevent war, to avert crisis, to pro-
vide maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to under-
write regional and global stability.
Formerly, strike groups would bring their command and control with them
as a near-autonomous capability, in a virtual “bubble” of situational awareness
and C2. Today, because of the long reach of naval weapons and sensors, the di-
versity and mobility of afloat forces, and their increasing criticality to other joint
commanders for application across a wide range of missions, that bubble must
be expanded and integrated into a joint doctrinal and C2 “blanket” that extends
over and across regions. This requirement for integration is forcing the locus of
planning and assessment to a higher level, into a joint functional maritime head-
quarters. We are maturing now the processes, terms of relations, and functions
of this “Maritime Headquarters” and the “Maritime Operations Center.”*
These concepts are driving the Navy to review how it operates, commands,
and controls maritime forces, in a globally synchronized way and in routine con-
cert with a wider range of partners. The Naval War College has been at the center
of the Navy’s ambitious effort to rethink its command-and-control structures
and its operational headquarters functions. Given the traditional role the Col-
lege has played in developing expertise at the operational and strategic levels,
and given its involvement and leadership in the current raft of operational-level
initiatives, it is well positioned to help the Navy define the competencies neces-
sary to operate these evolved headquarters and operations centers.† Getting
manpower requirements right is always challenging, but the fact that the Navy is
still coming to grips with the broader, more robust command and control
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
* “MHQ w/ MOC,” or Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center. The MHQ is the
headquarters that supports a maritime commander focused above the tactical level (i.e., at the op-
erational level). The MOC is not the command center but rather that portion of the maritime
headquarters (a combination of personnel, systems, and processes) that supports the operational
requirements of the commander that could have various operational roles assigned (e.g., num-
bered fleet commander, as a designated joint-task-force commander). The MHQ w/ MOC concept
is viewed as a system of systems whereby MOCs around the globe are connected so as to provide
maritime situational awareness, support maritime security, and provide “reachback” to each other
to deliver maritime capabilities to the combatant commanders.
† A Chief of Naval Operations e-mail of 24 November 2006 to the President of the Naval War College
and Chief of Naval Personnel directed the College to identify the personnel and training require-
ments for MHQ w/ MOC. This followed verbal tasking to determine “what kinds of people and
competencies . . . we need in these headquarters and MOCs.”
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implied by its new strategy and operating concepts makes this assignment more
difficult still. Nonetheless, great progress has been made. Even more promising,
the process that the Naval War College has built to respond to this tasking prom-
ises to apply as well to the problem of defining manpower requirements more
broadly across the Navy.
Understanding Manpower Requirements in Terms of Joint Capabilities
The Navy is coming to grips with the need to understand manpower requirements
in terms of joint capabilities. Building on the work of the Quadrennial Defense Re-
view,* the Navy has determined that we need to understand manpower in terms of
“capabilities”—and that this capability-driven aspect of manpower would result in
understanding the Navy’s workforce requirements. Manpower requirements
would, perhaps for the first time, be linked directly to mission-essential tasks in order
to understand the effect of manpower decisions on warfighting readiness. This is
how we must determine what expertise belongs in our operational headquarters
and operations centers—by looking first at what they must do and how they must
do it.
Historically, the Navy has been world class at building competence through
training. Further, its forward-deployed tempo has generated vast experience.
However, competence emerging from training and deployment experience is
predominately tactical in nature. On the other hand, Naval War College re-
search, empirical evidence, and senior leadership assessment demonstrate that
operational- and strategic-level competence is built through a blend of focused
training, education, and experience across a continuum: competencies are built
over time. Experience in tactical tours, no matter how strenuous, simply does
not normally equate to expertise at the operational level of war.
The College’s response to the tasking of the Chief of Naval Operations even-
tually involved a cross-functional team of experts to conduct research in part-
nership with U.S. fleet forces.† Starting with joint warfighting-capability
requirements, the team set out to articulate a comprehensive understanding of
the operational-level-of-war domain; to build from an inclusive view of how
mission-essential tasks, organizational processes, systems, and people need to
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a congressionally mandated vehicle through which the
Defense Department undertakes a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources. Spe-
cifically, the QDR is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most re-
cent National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget
plan allowing the military to execute successfully the full range of missions within that strategy.
† This collaboration, defined below as the Capabilities Based Competency Assessment, is led at the
Naval War College by Professor Richard Suttie. Together with Fleet Forces Command’s MHQ w/
MOC Project Team, the College has conducted a two-year study to map the manpower require-
ments and skill sets necessary to support the new concept.
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work together; and then to integrate a dynamic, analytically reliable, valid, and
repeatable methodology that would generate the manpower requirements for
the operational level of war. This effort came to be known as CBCA (Capabilities
Based Competency Assessment) and is viewed as a critical path to implementing
the Navy’s new headquarters concept.
Ultimately, we expect the CBCA process to yield specific manpower require-
ments, including competencies that the warfighter identifies as critical to mis-
sion tasks. It should also give us valid, reliable, capability-focused, and
competency-based manpower requirements for MHQ/MOC operational posi-
tions. It will also identify, for each operational position, the importance, fre-
quency, and duration of use of specific equipment and systems and the
language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC) competencies
needed. Through process-based analysis and optimization we also expect to
understand the manpower costs and savings.
This work will continue through 2009, but we estimate that the methodology
will lead to fundamental changes in how people are understood—in the context
of tasks, work, and missions. This will alow us at the Naval War College to under-
stand better how the genius of our academic faculty and the curricula that the
faculty creates yield the capabilities demanded by our new strategy and its en-
abling concepts. As this vanguard effort reports out, we will know that what we
are teaching is on target, and if it is not, we—as we have demonstrated the re-
sponsiveness to do—will adjust fires.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 3
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